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RECONSIDERING FLOOD v. KUHN
STEPHEN F. Ross*
As this article is being written, a strike scuttled one of the
most exciting baseball seasons in years and threatens future ones
as well. The strike marked the eighth consecutive time the "Na-
tional Pastime" has been interrupted following the expiration of a
labor-management agreement. At the same time, baseball owners
steadfastly refuse to appoint a Commissioner for fear that the
Commissioner's traditional power to act "in the best interests of
baseball" might interfere with their own personal interests.' Addi-
tionally, two precedents arising out of the National League's re-
fusal to allow the San Francisco Giants to relocate to Tampa Bay
pose a serious threat to baseball's historic exemption from the an-
titrust laws.' The litigation follows several congressional inquiries,
during which former Commissioner Fay Vincent acknowledged
that a significant motivation for baseball owners' reluctance to per-
mit expansion or relocation to Tampa Bay was their desire to keep
that area open as a "baseball asset"3-a candid admission that
many franchises have used the threat to relocate to Tampa in or-
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B., J.D., University of California (Berke-
ley). This Article has been in the making for several years. I have had the opportunity to
employ some of the arguments contained herein in testimony before a House committee, see
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 163-89 (1993) [hereinafter
Brooks Hearings], and in a brief filed as pro bono counsel to the Consumer Federation of
America and Sports Fans United in Butterworth v. National League, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.
1994). For extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts, I wish to thank Jim Brudney, Bill
Eskridge, Phil Frickey, Lee Goldman, Warren Grimes, Kit Kinports, John Nowak, Ed Weil,
and Nick Zeppos.
1. Murray Chass, A Decision: No New Commissioner, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 20, 1994, Sec.
B, at 15.
2. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Butterworth v.
National League, No. 82,287 (Fla. 1994). Baseball owners reached a monetary settlement
with the Piazza plaintiffs; in Butterworth, the Florida Supreme Court held that baseball's
exemption would be narrowly construed and did not immunize the National League from
the Florida Attorney General's antitrust investigation, which is apparently closed.
In addition, a class action has recently been filed on behalf of businesses located near
baseball stadia, season-ticket holders and fans, asserting Sherman Act challenges to a host
of practices by Major League Baseball. McCoy v. Major League Baseball, No. C95-0383R
(W.D. Wash).
3. See Baseball Antitrust Immunity: Hearing Before the Subomm. on Antitrust, Mo-
nopolies and Business Rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 33
(Serial No. J-102-90) (1992) (hereafter Metzenbaum Hearings).
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der to force their existing communities to provide generous public
subsidies for new stadia at below market rents." Moreover, even if
the 1994 season had been completed, a new broadcast agreement
signed by baseball's moguls would have denied fans, for the first
time since national telecasting began, the opportunity to watch all
post-season games on over-the-air television. Combined with the
looming threat of pay-per-view, baseball fans may well be forced to
pay to watch games they can now view for free.
Each of these woes can be traced directly to the monopoly
power that Major League Baseball exercises-power that is attrib-
utable to the judicially created exemption baseball enjoys from the
antitrust laws. This exemption was last ratified by the Supreme
Court in its 1972 decision in Flood v. Kuhn.5 Flood's specific hold-
ing was that the historic "reserve clause," by which clubs agreed
never to compete for the services of players who were the "prop-
erty" of another team, was exempt from antitrust scrutiny. At the
time, the Court believed that requiring clubs to compete under the
antitrust laws would ruin the sport. Today, by contrast, it appears
that the Court's assumption is wrong: (1) the competition for play-
ers resulting from developments in labor law has helped, not hurt,
the sport; (2) allowing owners to demand that players agree to ex-
cessive restrictions on competition, and depriving players of the
option of filing an antitrust suit to block such restrictions, has in-
creased, rather than decreased, labor strife; and (3) permitting
baseball owners to conspire to block expansion or relocation into
lucrative areas has hurt fans and taxpayers, both in these areas
and in communities with existing teams. Given the current labor
4. See, e.g., John Kass & Daniel Egler, Sox Will Stay if Legislature OKs Proposal,
CHICAGO TRIB., May 12, 1988, Part I, at 1; Giants OK Deal to Leave - League to Vote on
Sale to Florida Group, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 8, 1992, at Al (San Francisco Giants
owner, disenchanted with current stadium and voter refusal to subsidize a new one, shop-
ping team around to any buyer, with no regard for keeping team in the area); Stefan Fatsis,
Seven Strikes and Still Swinging: St. Petersburg Still Hopes to Get a Major-League Team,
CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER, July 14, 1993, at 5F (detailing emergence of local buyers to pre-
vent relocation to Tampa of teams in Oakland, Minnesota, and Dallas-Fort Worth).
Tax subsidies and favorable stadium deals have replaced local media revenues as the
most important factor in franchise value and profitability, allowing mid-size market clubs
such as the Texas Rangers, Baltimore Orioles, and Cleveland Indians to earn above-average
incomes. Michael K. Oznian and Brooke Grabarek, Foul!, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 1, 1994, at 18-
20.
Of course, baseball's acting Commissioner, Milwaukee Brewers' owner Bud Selig, would
never threaten to move to Tampa for such exploitive purposes. Rather, if sufficient tax sub-
sidies were not forthcoming in Wisconsin for the Brewers, Selig threatened to move to Phoe-
nix or Charlotte! Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SgroN
HALL J. SPORT L. 297, 303 (1994).
5. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
[Vol. 12:169
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dispute and the recent precedents about franchise location, recon-
sideration of the holding in Flood v. Kuhn could not be timelier.
Within the academia, two very different groups of legal schol-
ars have devoted a great deal of attention to Flood. Those special-
izing in sports law have either attacked Flood as a ridiculous deci-
sion that improperly distinguished between baseball and other
professional sports, or have praised it for waging guerilla warfare
on the idea that Section 1 of the Sherman Act should apply to
intra-league arrangements by owners of professional sports teams.6
Those viewing Flood through the lens of statutory interpretation
perceive the decision as adhering rigidly to the principle of stare
decisis; this rigidity has been both praised and criticized, and
Flood has also been attacked for unjustifiably relying on legislative
inaction to infer congressional support for earlier precedents.
7
In this Article, an alternative theory is sketched. Although
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Flood was eminently sensi-
ble in 1972, as a matter of both judge-created sports law doctrine
and the legisprudential application of stare decisis, this is no
longer the case. In 1972, Justice Blackmun and his colleagues in
the majority were justifiably concerned that applying the Sherman
Act to professional baseball might ruin our "National Pastime."
However, a brief look at subsequent developments in baseball and
in antitrust law clearly demonstrates that the situation has
changed. Read in its full context, rather than mechanically, the
majority opinion in Flood applies a fact-based legisprudential stan-
dard to questions of stare decisis, not the formalistic approach
that some have attributed to it.' Flood represents neither an un-
6. Compare Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional
Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. PIr. L. REV. 209 (1983), with Brooks
Hearings, supra note *, at 77 (Statement of Prof. Gary Roberts). See also Gary R. Roberts,
Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 337, 340 n.7 (1986) ("for all practical purposes, baseball is constrained in essentially
the same way as all sports leagues would be if properly treated as single firms for section 1
purposes").
7. Compare Lawrence A. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 229 (1989), with William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); and William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 106 (1987). See also
Berger, supra note 6, at 209; and C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes:
The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 HouSTON L. REV. 611, 622 (1977).
8. A host of commentators have read Flood as refusing to overturn prior precedent
because of stare decisis, or simply because Congress had failed to pass corrective legislation.
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 589 n.112; Robert A. McCor-
mick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in Professional Base-
ball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1149 (1982); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single
1995]
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thinking invocation of the dead weight of precedent, nor an unso-
phisticated and unwarranted deference to a congressional failure to
overturn the Court's prior decisions. Rather, its holding is much
more limited. Flood reveals that the Court will adhere to a prece-
dent where it perceives that reliance interests are strong and that
the public interest is better served by preserving the precedent.
Under this reconsidered view of Flood, the Supreme Court today
should reach the opposite result and subject baseball to antitrust
scrutiny.
This Article is not intended to persuade critics of Flood v.
Kuhn that Justice Blackmun's opinion was the only correct resolu-
tion of the case; the Court could have used the opportunity to sub-
ject baseball to the rule of reason standard ultimately applied to
sports organizations in 1984.' Nor is it intended to persuade
Flood's supporters that Major League Baseball is an abusive mo-
nopolist that should be subject to the antitrust laws, since that
topic has been addressed in detail elsewhere. 10 Rather, it is in-
tended to demonstrate that Justice Blackmun's opinion may have
been misunderstood.
Flood was written during Justice Blackmun's second full term
on the Supreme Court. At the time, some referred to him as the
"Minnesota Twin," a moniker that accurately described his love of
his hometown baseball team but, as history proved, incorrectly
suggested his identification with the more conservative jurispru-
dence of his fellow Minnesotan, Chief Justice Warren Burger. Over
twenty years of hindsight have led to the recognition that, instead
of basing his decisions on arid legalities, Blackmun was a jurist
committed to deciding cases in their real context and interpreting
statutes with an appreciation of the evolving and dynamic quality
of law." Viewed as an example of dynamic and contextual statu-
tory interpretation, Flood was a justifiable response by a Court
concerned that inflexible application of an 1890 statute would ruin
a great American institution. However, courts have since demon-
strated that they are able and willing to apply the antitrust laws to
Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751, 752 n.2 (1989); A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the
Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEXAS L. REV.
1071, 1084 n.80 (1988) (book review).
9. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 84 (1984).
10. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989) (hereaf-
ter Monopoly Sports Leagues); Brooks Hearings, supra note *.
11. John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20,
1983, at 20; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479, 1492 (1987); Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 717, 734 (1983).
[Vol. 12:169
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joint ventures in a sophisticated and flexible fashion. Additionally,
even though the antitrust monopoly continues, competition among
baseball owners for player talent has contributed to a competitive
balance and the game's popularity. Thus, it now seems that the
specific concerns that had led previously to the Flood holding,
should now lead to its reversal.
I
Justice Blackmun deserves some of the blame for the misread-
ing of Flood. His references to the baseball antitrust exemption as
an "anomaly" and an "aberration" obscure the policy arguments
he marshalled to support his conclusion that continuing the ex-
emption was necessary in "recognition of baseball's unique charac-
teristics and needs."12 Recalling Justice Blackmun's self-assess-
ment that his jurisprudence has not significantly changed over the
years,13 several factors suggest that these policy arguments, al-
though not articulated as elegantly as they might have been, or as
clearly as Justice Blackmun himself would explain in later years,
were, in fact, determinative. First, the Court was convinced that
the reserve system, the restraint at issue in Flood,4 was essential
for the continued integrity of the game. Second, in 1972, the Court
had reason to believe that contemporary antitrust doctrines would
condemn many arrangements among owners that are arguably es-
sential to baseball. Neither of these considerations exist today.
A
As even casual students of Flood know, Part I of the opinion is
an ode to baseball.' 5 Without explanation, Justices White and Bur-
ger declined to join that part. Off-the-record comments, including
some attributed to other Justices, ridiculed Justice Blackmun for
12. 407 U.S. at 283.
13. See Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the
Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 52 (1985).
14. The reserve system challenged in Flood included an agreement among all baseball
owners to use a uniform player contract that confined players to the club with which they
had previously contracted and gave the club the unilateral right to renew the contract each
year. 407 U.S. at 259 n.1.
15. Entitled "The Game," Part I provides a brief summary of baseball history, includ-
ing the famous list of the "many names, celebrated for one reason or another, that have
sparked the diamond and its environs and that have provided tinder for recaptured thrills,
for reminiscence and comparisons, and for conversation and anticipation in-season and off-
season." It also quotes from several well-known poems about baseball and concludes by
referring to baseball as either a "national pastime" or, citing George Bernard Shaw, "the
great American tragedy." Id. at 260-64.
1995]
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the content of Part I.1" If Flood is seen, however, as a decision
grounded in a desire to adopt sound legal rules for sports leagues,
Part I makes eminent sense. It was necessary to establish the
unique role that baseball plays in American culture, in order to
demonstrate that the Court should not-and that Congress proba-
bly did not intend to-ruin the "National Pastime" by applying
inflexible legal rules.17
In numerous places, Justice Blackmun's opinion reflected the
majority's view that antitrust scrutiny would jeopardize the reserve
system and therefore ruin baseball. For example, he cited a noted
sports historian's conclusion that baseball had been "saved" by
Justice Holmes' decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Inc.,'8 that
the baseball industry was not part of interstate commerce and
thus, not subject to the Sherman Act.' 9 Blackmun also quoted ap-
provingly from a House subcommittee report, which concluded
that a reserve clause was necessary. 0 Significantly, the opinion
quoted from Judge Moore's concurrence in the court of appeals de-
cision, which stated "'[i]f baseball is to be damaged by statutory
regulation, let the congressman face his constituents the next No-
vember.' "21 It also noted that a distinguished scholar, who had
participated as an amicus curiae in a prior case, Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc.,22 had argued that "unbridled competition as
applied to baseball would not be in the public interest. 2' Black-
16. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 190 (1979).
17. Calling Part I a "trace of resistance to the hyperrationality of contemporary legal
discourse," one commentator recognized that Blackmun was trying to "evoke the mysteri-
ous, inexplicable hold that baseball has on the core of American culture" in order to justify
"his - in the best sense - deeply conservative impulse not to tamper with the traditional
social order of the game." Paul Campos, Silence and the Word, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139,
1142 (1993). See also Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1389 (1989) (baseball continues to enjoy an exemption from the otherwise
broad scope of the Sherman Act "for reasons mysterious only to those ignorant of baseball's
grip on the national psyche").
18. 259 U.S. 200 (1922)[hereinafter Federal Baseball].
19. Flood, 407 U.S. at 271 n.10 (quoting HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY
YEARS 420 (1971)).
20. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Report on the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1952)
(hereafter "1952 House Report")).
21. Id. at 269 n.9 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1971)) (emphasis
added).
22. 346 U.S. 356 (1953)[hereinafter Toolson].
23. Flood, 407 U.S. at 274 (quoting Thomas Reed Powell's Brief for Boston American
League Base Ball Co. as Amicus Curiae, Toolson v. New York Yankees, No. 18 (O.T. 1953)
at 2).
[Vol. 12:169
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mun also emphasized the trial court's finding that every witness
except Curt Flood himself had testified that some form of a reserve
clause was desirable.2 4
The fact that the Flood majority adopted this view is not sur-
prising in light of the brief filed on behalf of the respondents,
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn and the American and National
Leagues. The respondents devoted ten pages to "the reserve sys-
tem and the historical, competitive, and economic realities of pro-
fessional baseball," and forcefully articulated the view, which was
widely held in the early 1970s, that competition for player talent
(or "free agency") was unworkable in professional sports leagues
and that the reserve system was "a necessity." 5 Applying language
the Court had used in Radovich v. National Football League26 in
explaining why the judicially created antitrust exemption for base-
ball would not be extended to football, the brief thus marshalled
"strong indications that more harm than good would come from an
overruling" of the Federal Baseball precedent. All of this makes it
clear that the Flood majority not only attributed to Congress the
view that baseball should not be subject to antitrust regulation,
but, in addition, believed it themselves.2 7
It is important to recall that concerns about the workability of
competition among owners for players' services were supported by
the fact that no professional sports leagues had engaged in such
competition since the early part of the century, and that many at-
tributed the failures of early leagues to this sort of competition.28
One need not have been a scholar of sports history to have be-
lieved, in 1972, that what is known as "free agency" would harm
24. Id. at 268 (citing 316 F. Supp. at 275-76).
25. Brief for Respondents at 5-14, Flood v. Kuhn, No. 71-32 (O.T. 1971)[hereinafter
Flood Respondents' Brief].
26. 352 U.S. 445, 450 (1957).
27. Flood thus differs remarkably in both tone and content from Toolson and
Radovich. The former was a terse per curiam opinion, which asserted in conclusory fashion
that (1) Congress' inaction was dispositive evidence of its endorsement of the antitrust ex-
emption adopted in Federal Baseball; (2) strong reliance interests precluded reconsideration
of the exemption; and (3) any social welfare evils caused by the exemption should be reme-
died by new legislation. See 346 U.S. at 357. Radovich involved a practice far less defensible
than the reserve clause-the blacklisting of players who had "jumped" to a rival football
league-and neither the majority nor the dissenting Justices engaged in any discussion of
the degree to which player restraints like the reserve clause might be essential for the suc-
cess of the National Football League.
28. LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW 1 (1976) (citing 1952 House
Report, supra note 20, at 16-50). For a later and contrary view, arguing that the failure of
sustained competition within baseball is due to the owners' monopolistic practices, not to
the inherent unworkability of competition, see Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 10, at
718-21.
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the sport. The All-American Football Conference, founded as a ri-
val to the National Football League in the late 1940s, failed be-
cause the dominance of its champion, the Cleveland Browns, ru-
ined the league's fan appeal."' Fans were well aware that the New
York Yankees' dominance of the American League ended in the
mid-1960s, about the same time that an amateur draft curtailed
the Yankees' ability to sign a disproportionate number of the top
high school and college players.30 Although other professional
sports leagues were subject to the antitrust laws, no one had yet
challenged the restrictions in those sports, so there were no real-
life examples to prove that competition would work.
Today, of course, after almost two decades of experience with
free agency, the evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that end-
ing the reserve system destroyed neither baseball nor its integrity.
In fact, to the contrary, academic studies have shown that the re-
serve system actually hurt competitive balance in baseball. A com-
parison of pennant races before and after the reserve system was
effectively abolished in 1976 demonstrates that in the post-reserve
era, more teams were contenders in the pennant race, more
franchises won division titles, and there were fewer "blowouts"
with one team dominating the standings. Empirical analysis also
disproved the owners' claims that free agency would result in a
massive exodus of players to teams in large, warm-weather
markets."s
The logical link between the concern that the reserve system
was essential and the need for baseball's antitrust exemption was
also explained by the respondents in Flood, who described to the
Court their concerns about "the radical and abrupt change in base-
ball's antitrust status .. .from exemption to per se violation."3
29. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOTBALL 12-6 to 12-7 (3d ed. 1963) (Harold Claasen & Steve
Boda, Jr., eds.).
30. Indeed, Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn explicitly attributed the end of the
Yankees' dominance to the draft. He noted that prior to the draft the Yankees had won 11
of 13 pennants because of their ability "to sign most of the more promising youngsters be-
cause of their reputation, tradition and location." Hearings on H.R. 1206, et al., Before the
Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 194-95
(1972).
31. See Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 10, at 671-84 (1989) (citing author's
research and other studies).
The new era of free agency was the result of a new collective bargaining agreement
entered into following the arbitration decision in the Messersmith case, discussed, infra, at
notes 96, 106.
32. Flood Respondents' Brief, supra note 25, at 43.
Although most of the "extensive commentary" cited by the Court concerning this issue,
407 U.S. at 280-81 n.16, did not address the applicable antitrust standard that would be
[Vol. 12:169
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Applying antitrust's per se rule to baseball would, of course, con-
demn the reserve system, as well as a host of other agreements
among baseball owners.
Just three months before issuing its opinion in Flood, the
Court decided United States v. Topco Associates, Inc."s Topco
held that an agreement to allocate territories by a cooperative of
small grocery stores seeking to develop a private label brand was
per se illegal. Although the district court had found that the terri-
torial agreement was essential to Topco's efforts to compete suc-
cessfully against market leaders such as Safeway, A&P, and Kro-
ger, 4 the Supreme Court held that all agreements among
competitors to allocate territories were conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable under the Sherman Act, without regard to their
actual market impact. Topco could fairly have been read to suggest
that applying the antitrust laws to baseball would automatically
have prohibited any form of a reserve clause, as well as the elabo-
rate waiver system for assigning players to the minor leagues,
player development contracts with the minor leagues, and a host of
other rules. Although Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in
Flood suggested that the labor exemption would permit baseball to
continue necessary restraints involving players as part of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement,"5 this area of the law was not developed
in 1972, and no Justice made the argument that legitimate agree-
ments among owners addressing baseball's unique characteristics
and needs could be accommodated under contemporary antitrust
analysis. Significantly, Justice Blackmun wrote a short concurrence
in Topco, suggesting that the result was "anomalous" because its
effect was to "stultify Topco members' competition with the great
used were baseball subject to the Sherman Act, the articles that did discuss the issue almost
all supported the respondents' substantive policy contentions about the need for a reserve
clause and/or the inability of current antitrust doctrine to accommodate that need. See, e.g.,
Richard B. Blackwell, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reap-
praisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 859, 861, 870-72 (1971); Note, The
Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Sports Teams and the Anti-Trust Laws, 81
HARv. L. REV. 418, 421 (1967); Note, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets
the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 586-88, 623-24, 627 (1953); John Eckler, Baseball -
Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. CH. L. Rav. 56, 72-76 (1949).
33. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
34. United States v. Topco Assoc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (N.D.1ll. 1970), rev'd, 405
U.S. 596 (1972).
35. 407 U.S. at 294-96. Justice Blackmun responded that his opinion made "it unnec-
essary for us to consider" the points made in Marshall's dissent. Id. at 285. Combined with
the various policy arguments in favor of the reserve clause, this omission suggests that the
majority opinion is not simply a preference that Flood's challenge be resolved through the
process of collective bargaining rather than antitrust litigation.
1995]
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and larger chains," but conceding that it was a correct application
of precedents applying the per se rule.6
Today, Topco's broad language suggesting blanket condemna-
tion of restraints among joint ventures is no longer followed. The
antitrust laws today, as interpreted by the Court, permit sports
leagues to enter into agreements that are necessary to enable them
to offer their unique product in the marketplace.3 7 In National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma,8 the Court made it clear that virtually all agree-
ments among sports league owners will be governed by the rule of
reason. Baseball, like college football, is an "industry in which hor-
izontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to
be available at all," 9 and the Court in Oklahoma Regents em-
ployed a "structured rule of reason," analyzing the defendants' jus-
tifications for their restrictions and the "fit" between those ends
and the means chosen to achieve them."0 Consistent with the pro-
genitor of the modern rule of reason, United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co.,41 Oklahoma Regents recognized a variety of in-
terests that would support reasonable restraints - such as com-
petitive balance and the need to preserve sufficient amateurism to
distinguish college from minor league professional football.'2
The Court's reasoning in Oklahoma Regents contrasts sharply
with the attitude of those who, in the context of the antitrust doc-
trines existing in 1972 and earlier, nonetheless advocated that
baseball be subject to the Sherman Act, regardless of the conse-
36. 405 U.S. at 613-14. Although the Flood defendants argued before the trial judge
that the rule of reason should govern challenges to baseball practices (an argument which
"impressed" the trial judge), see Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 801 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
in the Supreme Court they emphasized the risks of per se illegality.
37. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
The case involved a blanket license sold to television and radio stations, juke box owners,
and other users of musical copyrights permitting the use of compositions by thousands of
Broadcast Music Inc.'s composer-members. Although these composers were literally rivals
who were fixing the price of the product, the Court held that the agreement was not per se
illegal because the price fixing was essential in order to market this new, jointly produced
license.
38. 468 U.S. 85 (1984)[hereinafter Oklahoma Regents].
39. Id. at 101. As examples, the Court noted that members of a league must agree on
matters such as the size of the field, the number of players on a team, the extent to which
physical violence is to be encouraged and proscribed, and on how to "define the competition
to be marketed." Id.
40. See Eleanor Fox & Lawrence Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Perspective:
Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936, 955 (1987).
41. 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
42. 468 U.S. at 102-03.
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quences.4" Although it is clear that, were the Court to overrule
Flood today, baseball's antitrust status would surely change, the
change would not destroy baseball, but instead would surgically
excise those practices that restrict competition while preserving all
practices reasonably necessary for the sport to prosper. As court
decisions involving other sports demonstrate, if baseball owners
were to increase their economic power by engaging in anticompeti-
tive schemes, such as using "dirty tricks" to block the creation of a
new league," tying players to overbroad contracts in order to block
a new league4 5 or to unreasonably prevent players from changing
teams," restricting public viewing of popular games to drive up the
fees for broadcast rights, 7 and departing from a lax view toward
franchise relocation to protect one particular owner,"4 then subject-
ing them to the antitrust laws would constrain their behavior. Of
baseball's current practices, the ones most likely to subject the
owners to antitrust liability are the agreement that the National
League may not expand or relocate teams without the approval of
American League owners (and vice versa)," the efforts to impose a
salary cap on players, 50 and the refusal to sell satellite broadcast
signals outside designated geographic territories.5 1 At the same
time, it is clear that the Sherman Act permits restrictions on com-
petition for player services that are reasonably necessary to main-
tain competitive balance within baseball 52 or to preserve the
game's integrity.53 Independent decisions by National and Ameri-
can League owners concerning franchise relocation and expansion
should also pose no serious risk of liability, assuming that they do
not appear designed simply to insulate a fellow member from com-
43. See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 415 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J.) (even if
reserve clause was essential to baseball's existence, "the public pleasure does not authorize
the courts to condone illegality").
44. United States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
45. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
46. McNeil v. NFL, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,982 (D. Minn.).
47. Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992).
48. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
49. See notes 127-129 infra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 122-124 infra and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., NBA Agrees to Let Hartford Cables Telecast Celtics and Knicks Games,
64 ANTMIUST & TRADE REG. REP. 543 (May 6, 1993).
52. McNeil v. NFL, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,982 (D. Minn.).
53. Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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petition. 5' Unique events, such as the World Series and the All-
Star Game, are appropriate and lawful areas of collaboration
among all teams. 5 Thus, in contrast to 1972, one can confidently
predict today that baseball owners would be subject to a sophisti-
cated and flexible rule of reason analysis that would permit them
to agree on matters reasonably necessary to accommodate the
sport's needs and the owners' legitimate interests.
As a matter of sports/antitrust doctrine, Justice Blackmun
had reason for concern that contemporaneous Sherman Act prece-
dents would ruin baseball by outlawing an essential aspect of the
game-the reserve system. This concern explains his need to ex-
plain his love of the game, and why baseball's "unique characteris-
tics and needs" justified a continued exemption from the Sherman
Act. In 1994, it is clear that modern antitrust law can account for
baseball's unique needs, and that it is unlikely that a strike-pro-
ducing salary cap, an output-restricting television rights contract,
or the inter-league collusion on franchise relocation and expansion
are among them.50
II
Justice Harry A. Blackmun has often been identified with
techniques of statutory interpretation that seek to promote a judi-
cial-legislative dialogue and to further a statute's public purpose.5 7
As with every other common technique of statutory interpretation,
though, these approaches create the inevitable risk that the Court
will erroneously attribute to Congress values shared by a majority
of the Justices." Because Flood does not explicitly adopt a dy-
54. Compare Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.)
(upholding jury verdict that league opposition to relocation of Oakland Raiders to Los An-
geles was illegal, based on evidence that restriction would unjustifiably protect Los Angeles
Rams from competition), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984), with National Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 84, 116 & n.55 (1984) (court would look favorably
on restrictions imposed by one of several leagues, where justified by desire to compete more
effectively with rival league).
55. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(noting pro-competitive nature of agreement creating unique product).
56. See Part III-B infra.
57. One commentator observed that Justice Blackmun "has consistently stressed a dy-
namic, evolutionary view of the judiciary." Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice
Blackmun, 96 HAxv. L. REV. 717, 721 (1983). The most frequently cited example of Black-
mun's dynamic interpretation is United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
209-16 (1979) (concurring opinion), which is based on "considerations, practical and equita-
ble, only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the [enacting] Congress .... "
58. For example, the teaching of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 459 (1892), that a "thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
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namic or purposive approach to interpretation, critics have faulted
its allegedly super-strong presumption against overruling statutory
precedents, chided the Court for giving excessive weight to legisla-
tive inaction as a basis for statutory interpretation, and dismissed
the reliance interests of baseball owners that Justice Blackmun al-
legedly sought to protect.
Rather than being read statically, Flood should be read dy-
namically. So read, it reflects neither a super-strong commitment
to stare decisis nor an abstract reliance on legislative inaction.
Rather, by reading Flood dynamically, it becomes apparent that a
number of factors led to the judgment that the Court's prior base-
ball precedents should not be disturbed: (1) evidence that Con-
gress approved of a continuing antitrust exemption for the very
reserve system Curt Flood had challenged; (2) the Court's own
view that maintenance of the reserve system was consonant with
social welfare; (3) the Court's preference for legislation that would
allow baseball to be governed by more flexible legal standards than
were permitted by the Sherman Act as interpreted by the Court in
1972; and (4) evidence that baseball owners relied on existing
precedents, not simply by anticipating that they would continue to
realize monopoly profits, but in the very way they organized the
sport. Considered in this light, two conclusions are apparent. First,
Flood's critics miss the mark, and second, if the Supreme Court
were to revisit the issue, virtually no serious antitrust challenge to
Major League Baseball's current practices should be dismissed on
authority of Flood v. Kuhn. Today, it is clear that there is no af-
firmative congressional preference for any Major League Baseball
practice likely to face serious antitrust challenge. Additionally, ex-
empting baseball's anticompetitive practices from antitrust scru-
tiny is no longer consonant with social welfare. Moreover, the
Sherman Act as interpreted by the Court in 1995, is sufficiently
flexible to handle baseball's needs, and the owners have no claims
of justifiable reliance on Flood that would warrant continuing the
exemption.
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers," has been criti-
cized on the grounds that "the problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the views
of the world whence they come than the views of those who seek their advice." Public Citi-
zen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 474 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). On
the other hand, judges who purport to decide controversial cases based on their own percep-
tion of the "plain meaning" of a statute do not necessarily fare any better. See James Lan-
dis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REV. 886, 889-91 (1930); Stephen F.
Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399, 421-25.
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A
Professor William Eskridge is a leading legisprudential critic
of Flood.59 He has called Flood "the most frequently criticized ex-
ample of excessively strict stare decisis." 0 Similarly, Dean Paul
Rogers has faulted Flood's reliance on congressional inaction as
contrary to precedent and result-oriented. 1 These scholars may
have been misled because Justice Blackmun did not explicitly base
Flood on its contemporary context.2 In light of the many instances
prior to Flood, where the Court had overruled statutory prece-
dents, however, it is possible that Flood was not based solely on
such a "comical adherence to the strict rule against overruling."63
Moreover, Flood did not adhere to the antitrust exemption
created by Federal Baseball and Toolson simply because Congress
has failed to pass legislation overturning those decisions. Although
the passage by the House in 1958 and the Senate in 1965 of legisla-
tion continuing the reserve system does not inexorably lead to the
conclusion that Congress affirmatively favored continuing the re-
serve clause,64 at differing times each chamber had clearly signalled
its view that the reserve system should be retained. Of course,
59. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedent, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361
(1988).
60. Id. at 1380.
61. Rogers, supra note 7, at 622-23. As Dean Rogers notes, the Court had explicitly
rejected reliance on legislative inaction on several occasions. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940) (cited with approval in Justice Douglas' dissent to Flood, 407
U.S. at 287 n.3); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
62. For a suggestion that judicial candor may not be appropriate for judges engaged in
dynamic interpretation, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 78 GEo. L. J. 353 (1989).
63. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1381. A list of the many Supreme Court decisions over-
ruling statutory precedents from 1962-1992 can be found in Appendix 2 to WILLIAM N. Es-
KRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 316-22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1994).
64. 2 Inquiry into Professional Sports: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on
Professional Sports, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 476 [hereinafter "Sisk Hearings"] (testimony of
Professor Lionel S. Sobel).
65. In 1958, the House Judiciary Committee favorably reported legislation that would
have treated all professional sports leagues equally. The bill applied the antitrust laws to
baseball, but exempted rules of all sports that were "reasonably necessary" to achieve goals
such as competitive balance. H.R. Rep. No. 1720, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958). The mea-
sure was narrowly approved on a 17-15 vote, with the dissenters complaining that the "rea-
sonably necessary" test created too much confusion and would result in too much litigation.
Id. at 10, 13. On the House floor, the bill was amended to immunize any agreement that
"relates to" matters including achieving competitive balance and the reserve system. 104
Cong. Rec. 12105 (1958). Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate with 52 co-spon-
sors. See id. at 12430-31, 13036, 13316. Later that year, the chair of the Senate's Antitrust
and Monopoly Subcommittee, Estes Kefauver, announced that the legislation would remain
in committee because of "opposition to the unconditional exemption from the antitrust laws
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the Court's own view that the reserve system should be preserved
made it easier to conclude that Congress felt the same way. View-
ing Congress' response to Toolson as affirmatively endorsing the
continuation of the reserve system, an endorsement with which
the Court agreed, makes this case quite different than if Congress
had simply done nothing and the Court did not feel strongly about
it either.
In criticizing Flood, Professor Eskridge masterfully refutes the
general argument that precedents should be adhered to because
the absence of any statutory amendment signals legislative acqui-
escence to the Court's interpretation. He uses Flood to illustrate
the principle that legislative acquiescence should not be inferred
from inaction. Artfully drawing on the insights from political sci-
ence and public choice theory, he lists a variety of explanations for
Congress' inaction other than its endorsement of Federal Baseball.
He suggests, first, that Congress might have been apathetic or ac-
tually disapproving of Federal Baseball, but failed to pass legisla-
tion overruling it due to a lack of a consensus on a remedy; second,
that a majority might have disapproved of the decision only to be
stymied by procedural roadblock erected by the minority; third,
that higher priorities and limited time might have precluded a dis-
provided in these bills." See PAUL A. PORTER, A REVIEW AND CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF
JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY IN THE PAST TWENTY YEARS, reprinted in 2 Sisk
Hearings, supra note 64, at 432. (Porter served as counsel to Major League Baseball).
In 1965, the Senate passed legislation similar to that which its Antitrust subcommittee
had killed seven years earlier. See 111 Cong. Rec. 22329. The Committee Report explained
that the exemption for the reserve system was "necessary to maintain competitive equality
among the member clubs .. " S. Rep. No. 462, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965). This time,
the legislation died in the House Judiciary Committee. Porter, supra, at 437. Justice Black-
mun cited this record in Flood. 407 U.S. at 281 and n. 17.
In light of Curt Flood's claim that the reserve system unreasonably restrained players,
one other piece of legislation, which barely missed passage in the Senate, could also be
viewed as supporting Justice Blackmun's thesis that Congress endorsed the reserve system
challenged in Flood. In 1960, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported, without recommen-
dation, legislation that would have granted broad antitrust exemptions for football, basket-
ball, and hockey, but would have limited the protection afforded to Major League Baseball's
reserve system to 40 players, plus 60 other players in their first four years of professional
baseball. This provision recognized that, in addition to restraining players, the reserve sys-
tem restrains rival leagues. Its clear purpose was to facilitate the ability of the new Conti-
nental League to begin operations in rivalry with the National and American Leagues. S.
Rep. No. 1620, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 10-11 (1958) (explanation of Sen. Kefauver). When the
bill's provisions restricting baseball's reserve system were stricken on a 45-41 vote, the Sen-
ate opted to recommit the bill was recommitted to the Judiciary Committee rather than
allow passage of legislation broadly exempting all sports from the antitrust laws. 106 Cong.
Rec. 14749 (1960). The debate on this legislation suggests that any concerns about the re-
serve system were limited, and that a broad consensus existed that some form of reserve
clause was necessary for baseball.
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approving Congress from action; or fourth, that the majority might
have agreed to forego corrective legislation in return for political
promises on other issues.6 6 Recent Supreme Court decisions seem
to support Eskridge's view of the unreliability of inaction as a
guide to statutory interpretation.6 7 Indeed, if Flood were based en-
tirely on legislative inaction, there is little doubt that it would be
quickly jettisoned today.
When Eskridge apples his sound arguments to the actual deci-
sion in Flood, however, he makes the faulty assumption that Flood
held that Congress had acquiesced in the broad exemption created
by Federal Baseball. If Flood is viewed, however, as a holding lim-
ited to a specific practice (the reserve system) at a specific point in
time (1972), Eskridge's critique has much less force. His alterna-
tive explanations for Congress' inaction are difficult to reconcile
with the strong endorsement of the reserve system found in several
committee reports.66 This endorsement constituted the "positive
inaction" on which Justice Blackmun relied.8 '
66. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1405-06.
67. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1452-53 (1994); Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990).
68. See, e.g., 1952 House Report, supra note 20. Indeed, in 1958, the combination of
political support on behalf of other professional sports leagues and general support for the
reserve system led 52 senators to co-sponsor legislation exempting the reserve systems of all
sports from antitrust scrutiny. The bill was killed by a subcommittee chair, suggesting that,
if anything, the procedural roadblocks and other factors mentioned by Eskridge worked at
that time to prevent passage of an even broader exemption. See, supra note 65.
69. 407 U.S. at 283. In a paragraph where he concluded that the congressional re-
sponse to Federal Baseball and Toolson was "obviously more than mere congressional si-
lence and passivity," Justice Blackmun may not have been as precise as he could have been.
In that paragraph, he suggested that the Court's conclusion that "Congress as yet has had
no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes" was
based on the fact that "[riemedial legislation has been introduced repeatedly in Congress
but none has ever been enacted." Id. However, the entire opinion makes it clear that his
judgment about congressional intent was based on far more than the simple fact that the
bills that had been introduced had not passed.
It is certainly true that Flood's inference of congressional intent from "positive inac-
tion" is not as strong as the inference that can be drawn in cases where Congress has re-
viewed a certain subject on which the Court has ruled, changing the law in some areas while
leaving the Court's decision untouched. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616 (1987) (Congress passed several bills amending Title VII without overturning
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983) (Congress passed legislation affecting IRS' methods of enforcing prior prece-
dent of Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1970), summarily af'd, 404 U.S. 997
(1971), but explicitly tailoring new provisions so as not to affect substance of Green). In-
deed, while Flood remains cited, see, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213
n.5 (1992), the Court has "observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation given
by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assis-
tance in discerning the meaning of that statute." Public Employees Retirement Sys. v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 169 (1989). This explains why Justice Blackmun felt it necessary to
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At least two courts agree with this analysis. In Piazza v. Major
League Baseball,70 a federal district court held that an alleged con-
spiracy to block the sale of the San Francisco Giants to buyers in-
tending to relocate the franchise to Tampa Bay was not immune
from antitrust scrutiny, because Flood limited the exemption to
the reserve clause. The court read Flood's acceptance that baseball
is a business engaged in interstate commerce as stripping Federal
Baseball and Toolson of any precedential value, and focused on
Justice Blackmun's language justifying dismissal of Flood's claim
on grounds that "baseball was left alone to develop for that period
upon the understanding that the reserve system was not subject to
existing antitrust laws."'" In Butterworth v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the state attorney general's investigation of the same conspir-
acy for possible violations of federal antitrust law7 could proceed
because baseball's antitrust exemption only applied to the reserve
clause. Acknowledging that this conclusion was "against the great
weight of federal cases regarding the scope of the exemption," the
Court nonetheless found the Piazza decision persuasive.7 4
The improper application of Eskridge's critique of reliance on
legislative inaction to the actual decision in Flood should not ob-
scure the soundness of his argument as a general matter of legis-
prudence. Legislative acquiescence should be disregarded where a
small, well-organized group that would benefit from one interpre-
tation of the legislative record is juxtaposed against a less-organ-
ized group whose interpretation is most consistent with the public
interest. As Eskridge has noted, professional sports owners fit the
classic public choice pattern of small group of homogenous,
enhance the probative value of congressional inaction by demonstrating at such length the
importance of baseball and the disastrous impact that the antitrust laws would have on the
sport. See generally James J. Brudney, Legislative History Treatment of Judicial Deci-
sions: Idle Chatter or Congressional Riposte, 93 MiCH. L. REV. 1 (1994).
Congress passed one statute relating to baseball and antitrust, the Sports Broadcasting
Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1291-95 (Supp. IV 1986)). That statute was explicitly drafted so as to avoid creating any
inference about congressional intent concerning the antitrust exemption for baseball. See 15
U.S.C. §1294 ("[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to change, determine, or
otherwise affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to any act...
except the agreements to which [this Act] shall apply").
70. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
71. Id. at 436 (quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 273-74) (emphasis changed).
72. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994)
73. The Clayton Act authorizes state attorneys general to sue on behalf of natural
persons within their states to enforce federal antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. §15C.
74. 644 So. 2d at 1025.
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wealthy individuals likely to organize to lobby vigorously against
any efforts to take away the antitrust exemption. On the other
hand, fans who are injured by the baseball exemption are unlikely
to organize: they are generally unaware of their injury, and the
stakes for each individual are so small that they do not justify ex-
tensive lobbying. Under these circumstances, ascribing meaning to
congressional inaction tilts the scales in favor of powerful special
interests, and refusing to do so reflects a proper judicial effort to
balance the scales a bit.
Recent legislative developments concerning the antitrust ex-
emption illustrate both how the "positive inaction" relied on in
Flood differs from the more typical situation when a variety of fac-
tors can explain congressional inaction, and how baseball legisla-
tion reflects the public choice model of special interest lobbying. In
the past two years, hearings were held by the antitrust subcommit-
tees in both the House and the Senate.75 Major League Baseball
responded by hiring an influential, full-time lobbyist, and increas-
ing their political contributions. 76 Legislative repeal of the anti-
trust exemption was publicly supported by the Major League
Baseball Players Association, several consumer groups, representa-
tives from Florida who hoped to attract an expansion team to the
Tampa Bay area, and some academics (including this author). The
hearings revealed public opposition by Major League Baseball and
the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (minor
league baseball). 77 Major League Baseball owners then conducted a
well-publicized flirtation with Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell, raising the possibility of his becoming Commissioner of
Baseball, following his decision not to seek re-election. 78 Finally,
unable to persuade the committee to even seriously consider this
bill, the Senate sponsor proposed narrower legislation strongly
pushed by the players' union to eliminate the exemption for labor
issues. Baseball owners strongly objected to interfering with pend-
ing labor negotiations. Although the legislation was supported at
this juncture the AFL-CIO, the Consumer Federation of America,
75. See Brooks Hearings, supra note *; Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 3.
76. Steve Neal, Callahan Steps Up to the Big Leagues, CH. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993,
at 29; Craig Karmin & David Grann, Baseball Execs Prevail in Campaign Spending, THE
HILL, Feb. 15, 1995, at 1 ("Major league onwers and executives personally gave more than
$200,000 to congressional campaigns during the 1993-1994 election cycle, while the 20 high-
est-paid players, whose combined salaries total more that $94 million, gave nothing, accord-
ing to Federal Election Commission Records.").
77. See Brooks Hearings, supra note *; Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 3.
78. Steve Marantz, The Merchant of Dennis, SPORTING NEWS, July 4, 1994, at 14.
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as well as five of the eight Republican members of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, the bill was resoundingly defeated, garnering
only two Democratic votes. (When was the last time that Strom
Thurmond and Orrin Hatch voted in favor of a bill supported by
labor and consumer groups, only to see it defeated by the likes of
Edward Kennedy and Joseph Biden?).
The inability of consumer groups to lobby effectively for
broad-based legislation is reflected by the Judiciary Committee's
willingness to consider legislation only when it aided the one active
group with the financial ability to support a lobbying effort-the
players. In stark contrast to clear congressional support for the re-
serve clause contained in the post-Toolson legislative record cited
in Flood, legislative developments since Flood do not reflect any
such endorsement of any of Major League Baseball's current prac-
tices. Rather, many of the Senators who voted against the legisla-
tion criticized Major League Baseball, but felt that the matter
needed further study, not wanting to interfere in a pending labor
matter, or hoping to curry favor with Major League Baseball to
secure an expansion franchise for their state."9
On the House side, although a majority of the Judiciary Com-
mittee joined a report sharply critical of baseball's antitrust-ex-
empt status,8 0 they nonetheless chose to favorably report scaled-
down legislation that gave the players' union the right to file an
antitrust challenge against a salary cap as a means of dealing with
the current strike.8' However, even though an impending congres-
sional adjournment prompted sponsors to take no further action
79. See, e.g., Donald Kaul, Lust for Loot Will Be Baseball's Downfall, HOUSTON
CHRON., July 14, 1994, at 18 (Senator Joseph Biden opts for further study although he ad-
mits that the "way in which sports teams are able to hold up the taxpayers without any
obligation is close to unconscionable"); Marantz, supra note 78 (Arizona Senator Dennis
DeConcini explains that he voted against the legislation based on promise to expand to
Phoenix); Karl Vick, Baseball Wins One in the Senate, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 24,
1994, at 1A (Alabama Senator Howell Heflin seeks to avoid intervention in pending labor
dispute).
Author's Note: This article was originally accepted for publiction in the fall of 1994. As
the article is being printed, the Senate Judiciary Committee has favorably reported (al-
though it had not filed a report on) S. 627. Consistent with the article's prediction, the bill
removes the antitrust exemption, but specifically provides that the legislation will not affect
the "applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws" to agreements affecting minor
league baseball, franchise relocation, or broadcasting. In other words, the only significant
restraints likely to be challenged under S. 627 are those lobbying players-the only active
group with the financial ability to support a lobbying effort. However, the language quoted
above clearly demonstrates that the current Congress simply is unable to reach a consensus
concerning other restraints of baseball.
80. H.R. Rep. No. 871, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Brooks Report].
81. Mark Maske, House Move Could Limit Owners, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1994, at C1.
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on the bill,8 2 the Committee emphasized that, by reporting this
narrow bill, it "is in no way endorsing the view that the exemption
extends beyond the facts of Federal Baseball." Indeed, the major-
ity concluded that the record compiled before the Committee sug-
gested "a strong agreement for sweeping, if not total, repeal."83
In short, while a case can be made that congressional failure to
overturn Toolson was based on a legislative consensus that the re-
serve clause challenged in Flood should be maintained, there is no
evidence that a similar legislative consensus has existed since
Flood about any current baseball practice. Therefore, just as Flood
was not decided simply as a matter of stare decisis and legislative
inaction, neither should any litigation that might be brought
today.
Similarly, the language in Flood expressing preference for a
legislative solution should not be read as adopting a blanket rule
that no precedent should be overturned."" Eskridge correctly ob-
serves that, three years after Flood, a unanimous Court explicitly
noted in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. that it has "not
hesitated to overrule an earlier decision and settle a matter of con-
tinuing concern, even though relief might have been obtained by
legislation. 8 5 Rather than seeing Reliable Transfer as a rejection
of Flood, the two opinions are reconciled if Justice Blackmun's
opinion is not read to suggest that any statutory precedent was
best left for legislative resolution, but rather that the precise issue
in Flood-baseball owners' liability under the antitrust laws for
agreeing on their player reserve system-was best left for legisla-
tive resolution. As discussed in Part I, Blackmun was of the view
(pressed on the Court by baseball owners) that the Sherman Act
would render the reserve system per se illegal. Yet, as the Court
noted, virtually everyone agreed that some types of restrictions
were essential for the game. Thus, the Court perceived that a legis-
lative solution was necessary in this specific context in order to
ensure that necessary restrictions would be lawful.8 6
82. Id.
83. Brooks Report, supra note 80, at 4.
84. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1387.
85. 421 U.S. 397, 409 n.15 (1975) (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 n.1 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
86. This explanation also answers Eskridge's argument that Flood stands for the pro-
position that controversial political decisions are best left to the legislature. Eskridge, supra
note 59, at 1407-08.
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B
Even Eskridge concedes that a "plausible" way to reconcile
Flood with cases where the Court has overruled precedent is the
presence of strong reliance arguments in Flood.8 7 Justice Blackmun
noted that a key aspect of the Court's prior holding in Toolson was
that baseball had "been left for thirty years to develop, on the un-
derstanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legisla-
tion,"' 8 and he emphasized that "since 1922 baseball, with full and
continuing congressional awareness, has been allowed to develop
and to expand unhindered by federal legislative action."8 9 Justice
Blackmun's meaning is not entirely transparent. However, if we ac-
cept, as the Court apparently did, the respondents' arguments
about why the reserve system was essential to baseball, we can see
why the Court concluded that the reliance interests were indeed
significant.
In their brief before the Court, the respondents made two
forceful arguments in defense of the reserve system. First, they al-
leged that "without the balance provided by the reserve system,
the clubs with greater financial resources would attract the most
outstanding players" and, as a result, "successful and reasonably
balanced league play [would be] impossible to maintain." 90 Second,
they argued that "the employment continuity provided by the re-
serve system is necessary to protect, and provide incentive for, the
clubs' extraordinarily high player development costs."'" Although,
as noted above, these claims have not withstood the test of time,92
a judge who believed them might reasonably have concluded that
more was at stake than the fact that a group of wealthy individuals
had invested money in an unregulated monopoly in hopes that it
would continue to remain so. These claims suggested that the en-
tire structure of baseball was built on the assumption that the re-
87. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1382.
88. 407 U.S. at 273 (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).
89. Id. at 283. Although the quote does not refer specifically to the reserve system, this
practice is the only one Justice Blackmun discusses, and two sentences later he expressly
notes that the Court "has concuded that Congress as yet has had no intention to subject
baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes." Id. (emphasis added).
90. Flood Respondents' Brief, supra note 25, at 7.
91. Id. at 9.
92. See text accompanying note 31 supra. Although there has been no significant
change to date in the minor league farm system approach to player development (each club
operates approximately six minor league teams to develop its own players), this is arguably
due to the collective bargaining agreements with the Major League Baseball Players Associ-
ation, which limit free agency players with six years of service. The willingness of the play-
ers' union to agree to this limitation was, of course, unknown when Flood was decided.
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serve system would continue to exist and that major modifications
would be required were the reserve system to be significantly mod-
ified. While clearly an individual, who pays a premium to purchase
a company that enjoys an antitrust exemption, should not be able
to rely on its perpetual existence, 93 baseball owners might still
have had a plausible reliance argument even if everyone who had
purchased a team since Toolson had explicitly confessed that they
were aware of the risk that the sport would lose its exemption. The
legitimate reliance claim in Flood was not the ability to continue to
monopolize, but rather, on the fact that the way in which the sport
was organized would have been different had there been no exemp-
tion. Thus, many observers were surprised to find that the free
agency sought by Curt Flood did not lead to competitive imbalance
and the ruin of the "National Pastime" in the years following the
demise of the reserve system.94 Even those who still maintain that
Major League Baseball is headed toward fiscal ruin are not of the
1972 view that any significant modification in the reserve system
would ruin baseball 9 5
Of course, private reliance interests should not be elevated to
93. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv.
67, 123 (1987):
If a narrow, well-organized group wins a favorable interpretation - perhaps by
fortuity, perhaps by sheer perseverance - from the courts, an agency, or the
executive, and then builds its own reliance interests and trumpets it to Congress,
should the courts or agency not be able to change its mind later, when problems
with the interpretation become manifest?
94. A variety of factors may explain why free agency did not cause massive competi-
tive imbalance in baseball. The most important may be the difficulty in predicting which
free agents will really build champions, and the natural inclination of inferior teams to
spend more and take greater risks in order to improve. For a thorough discussion, see AN-
DREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS ch. 4 (1992).
95. Curt Flood did challenge Major League Baseball's argument that the reserve
clause was necessary and that the owners' reliance interests were significant, Brief for Peti-
tioner, Flood v. Kuhn, at 24-29 (No. 71-32), but one can see why his brief did not persuade a
Court wary of taking a risk that its decision might damage our "National Pastime." First, he
argued that the Court should not allow "businessmen to rely, for generations, upon palpably
erroneous interpretations of the Sherman Act at the expense of the public policy in favor of
competition." Id. at 24. But the Court's view of public policy (both its own and that it
attributed to Congress) did not favor unregulated competition. See text accompanying notes
17-27 supra. Second, he argued that restraints imposed by other leagues were not as severe
as Major League Baseball's reserve system. Brief at 26-27. It is important to recall that as of
1972, the precedents in other sports had not yet been established that make it clear that the
antitrust laws permit reasonable restraints on owner's competition for player services,
prohibiting only overly restrictive agreements. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (applying rule of reason to practices of sports leagues);
McNeil v. National Football League, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,982 (D.Minn.) (specifi-
cally applying rule of reason to restraints on player competition such as those challenged in
Flood).
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such importance that they subordinate major public values: the
courts should not have tolerated racial apartheid because many
white people came to rely on it to their advantage. But here, unlike
the foregoing analogy, the baseball owners' reliance interests were
consistent with the Court's view of public values-preserving base-
ball as we know it as our "National Pastime."96 As the following
part demonstrates, though, public values now point in favor of ap-
plying the antitrust laws to baseball.
III
The most recent decision to squarely address the interplay be-
tween legislative inaction and stare decisis is the Court's 1989
opinion in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.17 In Patterson, the
Court reaffirmed a 1976 decision holding that a post-Civil War
statute applied to certain types of private, as well as governmental,
race discrimination. All nine Justices agreed that they would re-
consider a precedent, even though Congress had not acted, if "the
intervening development of the law" had "removed or weakened"
the prior decision's "conceptual underpinnings,"' 8 or if experience
had shown that the prior decision was "inconsistent with the sense
of justice or with social welfare." 99 The Patterson Court was
sharply divided on whether to attach significance to congressional
failure to overrule a precedent in cases where Congress had ac-
tively reviewed the entire subject matter and had passed other leg-
islation based on the assumption of the precedent's validity. How-
ever, even those willing to attach more weight to such legislative
inaction demanded "something more than mere congressional si-
lence and passivity."' 100 Applying Patterson's standards today, the
Court should conclude that Flood's conceptual underpinnings have
96. Unlike the Flood court, the arbitrator who ultimately abolished the reserve sys-
tem rejected the owners' reliance claims. Relying on the contract law doctrine that perpetual
renewal clauses in contracts must be express, the arbitrator construed the standard player
contract and applicable Major League Rules to permit a team to reserve a player's services
for only one additional year after a contract expired. The arbitrator gave no weight to the
fact that baseball owners (and, given the challenge in Flood, the players as well) assumed
that the reserve clause was perpetual, viewing the owners' reliance claims as policy argu-
ments that should not factor into his task of interpreting the contract. Twelve Clubs Com-
prising Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101 (Dec. 23, 1975).
97. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
98. Id. at 173.
99. Id. at 174 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS).
100. Id. at 202 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Flood,
407 U.S. at 283).
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been removed, that maintaining baseball's antitrust-exempt status
is contrary to social welfare, and that the congressional record
since Flood reveals nothing more than silence and passivity.
Patterson, moreover, was not the first word on stare decisis.
Applying an earlier approach, Justice Louis D. Brandeis' oft-cited
dissent in Burnet v. Colorado Coal Co.10 1 leads to the same conclu-
sion. Brandeis insightfully distinguished between adherence to a
rule of law and to the necessarily contextual application of that
rule of law to particular controversies. His framework calls for
Flood's reconsideration, for it suggests that whatever the merits of
the legal principle that baseball's unique characteristics and needs
are exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the practices that Major
League Baseball engages in today that would run afoul of the Sher-
man Act are neither unique nor necessary.
A
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Patterson noted that
the "primary reason" for overruling a precedent is that "the inter-
vening development of the law" has "removed or weakened the
conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision."10 This factor
fully supports this Article's thesis that Flood was arguably correct
in 1972 but should be overruled today. It was certainly true that,
in 1972, the conceptual underpinning of Federal Baseball, the orig-
inal baseball exemption case, had been "removed or weakened."
Federal Baseball's holding that baseball exhibitions were not in-
terstate commerce was based on a view of interstate commerce
that was clearly reversed by the post-New Deal Court,103 as Justice
Blackmun acknowledged Flood.104 However, the most recent prece-
dent dealing with the baseball exemption-the Court's 1953 deci-
sion in Toolson-provided new conceptual underpinnings: a con-
cern about owners' reliance interrests and a preference for a
legislative solution. Between the years 1953 and 1972, there was no
change in Major League Baseball's stance that the entire system of
player development relied on the owners' ability to continue to
agree on the reserve system, and that applying the antitrust laws
to the reserve system would be so harsh that a legislative compro-
101. 285 U.S. 393, 446 (1932) (dissenting op.).
102. 427 U.S. at 173.
103. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
104. 407 U.S. at 282 ("baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce").
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mise was the only appropriate solution.""5
The last twenty-two years, however, have demonstrated what
the fifties and sixties did not-that Flood's concerns were un-
founded. Three years after Flood, a grievance arbitration interpret-
ing the standard player contract gave players the same relief that
Curt Flood had sought under the Sherman Act. 106 The owners and
the players' union responded by reaching a collective bargaining
agreement-which would, were baseball subject to the Sherman
Act, be exempted from antitrust scrutiny under the labor exemp-
tion.10 7 Under this agreement, the reserve clause was substantially
modified,108 attendance at baseball games rose significantly, 10 9 and
the value of baseball franchises has skyrocketed. 10
By contrast, the reliance interests that the Supreme Court has
recently found sufficiently wrightly to justify adherence to a prior
precedent are qualitatively distinct from those baseball owners
would raise today. Claimants who have successfully asserted reli-
ance-based arguments have demonstrated not only that overruling
the precedent in question would adversely affect them, but also
that, had they known of the ultimate demise of the precedent, they
would have ordered their affairs differently so as to avoid or miti-
gate harm. For example, the Court adhered to a precedent that
immunized mail order houses from certain tax liability based in
part on the fact that many firms had organized their business op-
erations in reliance on this immunity.1 " The Court also reaffirmed
an earlier decision subjecting state-owned railways to employer lia-
bility under a federal statute because many states had excluded
employees from their own worker compensation statutes on the as-
105. See Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
106. The standard player contract permitted a club to unilaterally renew the contract
for one year only, and that, after that one year, the player was a free agent eligible to be
signed by any club. Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101 (Dec. 23, 1975), discussed
supra note 96.
107. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
108. Players with six years of major league service became "free agents," able to sell
their services to the highest bidder; players with two years of experience could submit salary
disputes to an independent arbitrator.
109. Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 10, at 676 (citing data).
110. According to Timothy Mueller, director of KPMG Peat Marwick's sports indus-
try consulting group, the seventies and eighties saw baseball franchise values enjoy an an-
nual compounded increase of 20% to 25%. Anthony Baldo, Secrets of the Front Office;
What America's Pro Teams Are Worth, FINANCIAL WORLD, July 9, 1991, at 28.
111. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1923 (1992) (Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas, J.J. concurring).
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sumption that the federal statute provided adequate protection."' 2
Additionally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's power
to exclusively determine stream flows at federally regulated hydro-
electric plants was reaffirmed in part because a comprehensive reg-
ulatory structure had been erected based on federal preemption.113
In contrast, the principal adverse effect that antitrust scrutiny
would have today on baseball owners would be that they would no
longer enjoy the benefits of anticompetitive practices that might
well be deemed illegal under the Sherman Act."' To illustrate,
consider how baseball reacted owners would have during the past
decade had it known that, in 1995, it would lose its antitrust ex-
emption. Other than racing to maximize their ability to exploit
their monopoly power before legal constraints took effect, it is dif-
ficult to see how baseball owners would have structured player re-
lationships, television rights arrangements, or franchise locations
differently. Moreover, as noted in Part I, antitrust law, as it has
evolved since 1972, would permit the desirable aspects of baseball
112. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 560, 564 (1991).
113. California v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
114. Baseball owners could be adversely affected if a decision overruling Flood v.
Kuhn exposed them to treble damage liability for conduct occurring prior to the decision.
Whether this exposure would be unfair would depend on the degree to which, in the Court's
judgment, baseball owners had reasonably relied on Flood. The owners' argument would be
stronger, for example, in a case challenging to the reserve system still imposed on minor
league players than it would be in a case challenging broadcasting practices that are proba-
bly not within the scope of Flood as that case currently stands. See Henderson Broadcasting
Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Brooks Hearings,
supra note *, at 85 (testimony of Gary Roberts). Significantly, the labor exemption would
immunize owners from antitrust liability for any restraints on players that occurred during
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600
F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
Justice Marshall's dissent in Flood suggested that baseball's exemption could be over-
ruled prospectively, 407 U.S. at 293 n.5, a notion that the Court had expressly left open in
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964). Although the Court has recently indicated
its disapproval of this approach, Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S.Ct. 2510
(1993), Harper involved the Court's insistence that a rule be applied retroactively against
states in favor of individuals, and much of the Court's discussion focused on decisions pro-
spectively applying similar judicial decisions against governments. None of the cases dis-
cussed in Harper raised the specter of quasi-penal multiple damages awarded against indi-
viduals whose conduct was lawful under the then-prevailing legal rules and thus do not
discuss whether independent considerations-such as due processs-might compel prospec-
tivity in particular cases.
The Court divided five-to-four in Harper on the question of whether prospective over-
ruling is ever permissible. In light of the controversy and the narrowness of the vote, it is
unlikely that a majority of today's Court would feel constrained to uphold Flood solely be-
cause they would feel bound to apply a decision against baseball owners retroactively in all
circumstances.
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to continue to exist.'15 It is difficult to imagine how greater changes
in the legal standards governing baseball practices, or in the eco-
nomic realities concerning these practices, could have occurred
since Flood without a removing or weakening the decision's con-
ceptual underpinnings.
B
Significantly, Patterson also held that a precedent can justifia-
bly be overturned when it "becomes outdated and after being
'tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the
sense of justice or with the social welfare.' "" This criterion ex-
plains the result in both Toolson and Flood. In Radovich v. Na-
tional Football League,"7 the Court observed that Toolson contin-
ued baseball's antitrust exemption "because it was concluded that
more harm would be done in overruling Federal Baseball that in
upholding a ruling which at best was of dubious validity." Justice
Blackmun cited this explanation in Flood,"8 and, as Part I of this
Article makes clear, the Flood majority clearly believed that more
harm would be done to the National Pastime by overruling Tool-
son than by preserving it.
This explicitly normative criterion is a proper factor for courts
to consider in determining whether to overrule statutory prece-
dents. If Congress acted with complete information and unlimited
time, and followed a procedure that inevitably enabled the major-
ity to assert its will, one could plausibly argue that statutory prece-
dents should never be overruled because Congress would have
overturned any decisions with which it disagreed as a matter of
social policy. Because none of these assumptions accurately de-
scribe the legislative process, however, judges must necessarily
make interstitial discretionary judgments about statutory prece-
dents. The Court has not and should not enforce a rule of strict
stare decisis if a prior decision was based on outmoded reasoning
and there is no reason to believe that the legislature supports the
status quo; doing so would be inimical to the public interest in all
cases and, in many, would force Congress to divert its attention
from more important business to clean up judicial errors. On the
115. For an analysis of the legality of those aspects of baseball that most obviously
should be maintained, see supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
116. 491 U.S. at 174 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS).
117. 352 U.S. 445, 450 (1957).
118. 407 U.S. at 278.
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other hand, where a result remains consistant with social welfare,
there is no reason to overrule a precedent simply because sterile
legal analysis suggests it was incorrectly decided.
Whether or not, in the context of today's social problems, it
offends the Court's sense of justice for baseball owners to use their
monopoly power to suppress potential rivals, monopsonize the
player market, and exploit localities, Major League Baseball's mo-
nopoly is clearly inconsistent with social welfare. Allowed to freely
collude and monopolize, baseball owners have cost taxpayers mil-
lions of dollars in stadium subsidies, deprived millions of fans in
"have-not" cities of major league franchises, adopted player re-
straints that result in less competitive pennant races, permitted
rampant incompetence by management not checked by forces of
competition, and forced fans to pay for cablecasts of games they
used to be able to view for free.119 There is no reason to think that
the adverse consequences flowing from baseball's monopoly status
will not continue to be felt by fans across the country. In contrast,
as detailed below, subjecting baseball to antitrust scrutiny will
force owners to compete. In the process, several things will occur:
(1) owners will realize that undue restrictions on competition for
players will result in treble damage liability and that players will
be able to sue rather than strike to prevent these restrictions; (2)
Major League Baseball can be expected to expand to a few lucra-
tive new markets, creating thrills for millions of new fans and re-
ducing the existing owners' ability to threaten their current com-
munities with relocation; and (3) fans will be able to challenge
efforts to charge them to watch broadcasts of games now available
for free.
A leading antitrust/sports scholar, Professor Gary Roberts, de-
murs to this rosy view. He believes that recent cases applying the
antitrust laws to other professional sports leagues have been "in-
consistent, often unjustifiable, and generally counterproductive."120
Careful analysis of the antitrust challenges that could potentially
be made if baseball no longer enjoyed an antitrust exemption sug-
gests, however, that the methodology set forth in the Supreme
Court's only recent opinion concerning league sports-NCAA v.
Oklahoma Regents- would both preserve the desirable practices
now employed by Major League Baseball and promote consumer/
fan interests by barring anticompetitive agreements in a manner
119. See generally Brooks Report, supra note 80; Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra
note 10.
120. Brooks Hearings, supra note *, at 85.
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that was consistent, justifiable, and productive for fans and
taxpayers.
In the spring of 1993, Roberts asserted that he could not "im-
agine that players or consumers would be any better off today with
respect to the labor market if the antitrust exclusion were abol-
ished."'' However, as this Article was being written in the winter
of 1995, a baseball strike was upon us, because the owners unilater-
ally agreed to a salary cap. It is clear that both players and con-
sumers would have been better off if the players had the option of
using the judicial system, rather than a work stoppage, to attack
the salary cap. Giving football players the opportunity to convince
a jury that the NFL's player restraints violated the Sherman Act
avoided work stoppages and brought labor peace to that sport. Al-
though a detailed examination of the legality of a salary cap is be-
yond the scope of this article,2 2 it would appear that the salary
cap proposed by the baseball owners 23 is of doubtful legality. By
effectively limiting each team's payroll to 110 per cent of the
league average, the cap prevents teams with inferior records from
quickly improving in order to restore fan support. To date, courts
have cited the need to maintain a competitive balance as the only
justification for trade restrictions involving other sports,124 and the
proposed baseball salary cap seems to fail to meet that standard.
The most significant area of Roberts' critique concerns
franchise relocation and expansion practices. Roberts claims that
the Sherman Act is ill-suited to deal with the competitive
problems raised by these practices.12 5 Specifically, he is critical of
121. Id. at 82.
122. This author recently filed a brief, as pro bono counsel to the Consumer Federa-
tion of America and Sports Fans United, arguing that the NBA's salary cap is an antitrust
violation for the reasons sketched in text. Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Federation of
America and Sports Fans United, National Basketball Association v. Williams, No. 94-7709
(2d Cir. 1994).
123. Murray Chass, Owners Unveil Salary Cap Proposal To a Chilly Reception From
Players, N.Y. TiMEs, June 15, 1994, at B13 (original management proposal to prohibit club
payrolls from exceeding 110% of league average); Owners Prepare to Take Players Back,
N.Y. TiMEs, April 2, 1995, Sec. 1 at 1.
124. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 118
(1984); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976); McCourt v.
National Hockey League, 460 F. Supp. 904, 909-10 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Owners' claims that competition among
themselves must be restrained because it would otherwise be "ruinous," or because they
need to recoup investments, have been rejected because these claims are not unique to
sports leagues. Mackey, supra, 543 F.2d at 621.
125. Roberts does not complain about the substantive possibility that the Sherman
Act might require increased expansion. Rather, his objections reflect his concern that Sher-
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the Rule of Reason standard generally applied by courts in Sher-
man Act cases when evaluating restrictions imposed by members
of a sports league. This standard required that owners justify sig-
nificant restraints of trade by showing such restraints are reasona-
bly necessary to achieve some procompetitive goal.126 Unlike the
National Football League, which is organized as a single joint ven-
ture, however, Major League Baseball is organized as two leagues.
A court analyzing the legality of Major League Baseball's expan-
sion and relocation practices would likely focus first on the reason-
ableness of the provision in the Major League Agreement requiring
that American League owners approve any expansion or relocation
by a National League team and vice versa.12 7 This inquiry would
likely lead to a finding that this provision was unnecessary and an-
ticompetitive. As detailed elsewhere, 28 if the leagues were required
to make decisions about franchise location independently, consum-
ers would benefit from greater expansion and taxpayers would ben-
efit from the significant reduction in the teams' ability to extort
tax subsidies through threats of relocation. Thus, Roberts' con-
cerns about the courts' ability to determine when the antitrust
laws would permit owners of a single league to expand or permit
relocation are not applicable to Major League Baseball. This is
particularly true in light of the Supreme Court's suggestion that
the antitrust laws extend considerable latitude to intra-league de-
cisions concerning these matters if the league were in competition
with another league in the same sport.129
man Act decisions will be incoherent and that government ought not interfere with choices
made by private entrepreneurs. See Gary R. Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports
Leagues Revisited, 64 TULANE L. REV. 117, 143-45 (1989).
126. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726
F.2d 1381, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984) (courts determine if NFL rule "reasonably serves the legiti-
mate collective concerns of the owners or instead permits them to reap excess profits at the
expense of the consuming public"); id. at 1397 (to withstand scrutiny, NFL rules "should be
more closely tailored to served the needs inherent in producing the NFL 'product' and com-
peting with other forms of entertainment"); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d
606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976) ("focus of an inquiry under the Rule of Reason is whether the
restrain imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes, and is no more restrictive than
necessary"). These decisions are faithful applications of the venerable antitrust standard
enunciated by Judge William Howard Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 Fed. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
127. Major League Agreement, Art. V, § 2(b)(3), reprinted in Brooks Hearings, supra
note *, at 260.
128. Brooks Hearings, supra note *, at 161, 169; Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra
note 10, at 665-66.
129. Oklahoma Regents, 468 U.S. at 116 & n.55. This author has elsewhere responded
to Roberts' more general claim, Brooks Hearings, supra note *, at 88, that "there is no
sensible set of principles under current antitrust doctrine to explain when a [sports league]
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Thus, while fans would benefit if the American and National
Leagues were required by law to compete for new expansion sites,
each league could refuse to allow its existing franchises to relocate.
For example, it would be very difficult to show that the National
League's refusal to permit the Cincinnati Reds or the San Diego
Padres to move to Buffalo lessened competition when Buffalo
could persuade the American League to move or start a franchise
there. Absent collusion, if Buffalo could not lure either league, it
would be hard to argue that the absence of a team there was the
result of a restraint of trade.
Finally, Roberts makes no serious claim that the Sherman Act
would adversely affect Major League Baseball's legitimate interests
in the sale of broadcast rights. Indeed, he concedes that these ar-
rangements are not within the scope of the Flood exemption as it
stands today.130
Two other myths about baseball and antitrust, not discussed
by Roberts, also deserve mention. One is that the modest expan-
sion that would occur were the National and American Leagues to
stop colluding is bad for fans generally because the overall talent
in baseball would become too diluted. While some baseball purists
might violate § 1 of the Sherman Act if it grants or rejects a proposal to ...allow the
relocation of a member franchise's home games." In brief, any legitimate justification that
seems reasonably necessary to promote their product will be vindicated under the antitrust
laws. In contrast, the jury in the Raiders case found that the relocation from Oakland to Los
Angeles would not hurt regional rivalries, network schedules or traveling, that Los Angeles
could easily accommodate two teams, and that the NFL's claim of commitment to Oakland
fans was pretextual in light of its willingness to allow other team to threaten to leave their
communities if tax subsidies were not forthcoming. See id. at 172-74. In addition, the NFL's
refusal to permit the Raiders to relocate was based on a desire to protect the Los Angeles
Rams from competition for local fans within its geographic market.
130. Id. at 85.
The text makes no confident claim about the most analytically difficult issue concerning
antitrust and baseball-the impact that the Sherman Act would have on the minor leagues.
A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but this author has touched
on it in somewhat greater detail elsewhere. See Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 10, at
690-95 (arguing that without trade restraints, minor leagues funded by major league teams
or operated independently would continue to develop players). It is noteworthy that in re-
cent congressional hearings on this issue, industry witnesses did not identify a single agree-
ment involving the minor leagues that was both essential to permit minor league baseball to
continue operating in substantially the same manner as it has in the past and that would be
illegal under the Sherman Act. Brooks Hearings, supra note *, at 62-67 (testimony of Jim-
mie Lee Solomon, Major League Baseball Director of Minor League Operation); id. at 69-74
(testimony of Stanley Brand, Vice President, National Ass'n of Professional Baseball
Leagues). If, however, such an agreement were to be identified, the courts could, consistent
with the analysis suggested hereig, find the restriction to be the only remaining "unique
characteristic and need" of baseball and thus continue the exemption for that limited
purpose.
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who currently reside in Major League cities may perceive that ex-
pansion would diminish the quality of their entertainment, the
short answer, as demonstrated by the fans' reaction in Florida and
throughout the Rocky Mountain area to the new Marlins and Ro-
ckies franchises, is that the dramatic increase in satisfaction in the
new areas dwarfs any decreased satisfaction among the rest of
US.
1 3 1
A second myth is that the higher salaries paid to players in a
more competitive environment lead to higher ticket prices for fans.
The economics of ticket sales demonstrates that this is false. Be-
cause the number of tickets available for a season is fixed, each
franchise selects the price that will create the most ticket revenue.
Some franchises opt for near sell-outs at lower prices; others prefer
to charge higher prices, even though fewer tickets are sold. This
choice would be the same if every team's payroll were halved or
doubled overnight: the team would still prefer to make more
money, rather than less, on ticket prices.13 2
In sum, the methodology of the Patterson majority, unchal-
lenged by the concurring minority, recognizes that stare decisis
does not require adhering to a precedent shown to by experience to
be inconsistent with social welfare. The past twenty-plus years of
131. As rookie expansion franchises, the Colorado Rockies attracted a record attend-
ance of 4,483,270 and the Florida Marlins drew 3,064,847. Dave Anderson, The Year in
Review - 1993; Too Little to Cheer, Too Much to Mourn, N.Y. TnmEs, Dec. 26, 1993, Sec. 8,
p.1. See also Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 10, at 664-65. Moreover, these purists
overemphasize the degree to which expansion reduces the quality of the game for the aver-
age fan. (For example, the claim that expansion has significantly reduced the quality of
major league pitching must be counterbalanced by the average fan's recognized preference
for high scoring games.) As matter of general legal and economic policy, of course, baseball
should no more be able to limit expansion than should the Big Three automakers be able to
limit production to Cadillacs, Lincolns and New Yorkers on the grounds that expanding
output to produce Vegas and Escorts would reduce quality.
132. A comprehensive review of the economics of baseball agrees that baseball owners
will set prices in order to maximize revenue and their costs are ignored in this calculation.
ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS 53 (1992).
Because a more competitive environment leads to more exciting pennant races and does
not increase ticket prices, it is irrelevant that competition might lead to player salaries that
some might consider "unreasonable." Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 397-98 (1927) (rejecting "reasonable price" defense to price fixing). In any event, recent
data showing that 50% of Major League Baseball players earned less than $410,000 per
year, with a professional life of less than six years, and that the 58% of revenue devoted to
player salaries is comparable to that spent on salaries in other labor-intensive businesses,
such as advertising and business consulting (and less than the 75% spent by many law
firms!) demonstrates why the Supreme Court has been unwilling to allow any determination
of whether prices or salaries are, in fact, "reasonable." See Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Eco-
nomics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT LAW 287, 291 (1994); Timothy K.
Smith & Erle Norton, Throwing Curves, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at Al.
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monopolistic exploitation of fans, taxpayers, as well as players,
provides additional support for Flood's reconsideration.
C
A bare majority of the current Justices appear to be strongly
opposed to placing any reliance on congressional inaction to justify
adherence to precedent' 3S-an opposition that, of course, would
make it even easier to reconsider Flood. Although other justices
have been more willing to infer that from some forms of legislative
inaction signal congressional approval of judicial precedents, the
legislative reaction to Flood does not justify its continued vitality
even under this more relaxed standard. A previous majority of the
Court recognized that the legislative record "may be probative to
varying degrees" even if "inaction may not always provide crystal-
line revelation.""1 4 In a separate opinion in Patterson, Justice
Brennan argued that "evidence of congressional acquiescence that
is 'something other than mere congressional silence and passivity'"
may provide "more positive signs of Congress' views." ''
A comparison of the legislative records found probative by
Justices in this camp, with the legislative reaction since Flood,
makes it clear that the latter fails to contain "more positive signs
of Congress' view," but, rather, consists of "mere congressional si-
lence and passivity" from which all Justices agree that nothing can
be inferred. For example, these Justices attached significant weight
to the absence of congressional efforts to amend Title VII after the
Court upheld voluntary affirmative action by private employers,"'
emphasizing that Congress "ha[d] not hesitated" to pass corrective
legislation in the past when it disagreed with the Court"s interpre-
tation of Title VII. "Surely," Justice Brennan concluded, "it is ap-
propriate to find some probative value in such radically different
congressional reactions to this Court's interpretations of the same
statute."' s In contrast, Congress has enacted no legislation in the
133. In the majority opinion in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439,
1453 (1994), Justice Kennedy wrote that Congressional inaction was not indicative of au-
thoritative congressional intent, citing his own opinion in Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175 n.1,
and Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S.
616, 671-72 (1987). Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas.
134. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 629-30 n.7
(1987).
135. 491 U.S. at 202 (quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 283).
136. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
137. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629-30 n.7. The Justices comprising the majority in Johnson
and the minority in Patterson continue to adhere to this view. Their position was bolstered
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sports antitrust area since Flood.
Similarly, in Patterson itself, Justice Brennan argued that
stare decisis was appropriate because Congress had explicitly re-
jected an amendment that would have had the same effect as the
overruling the Court's earlier precedent. He also pointed to the
subsequent legislation whose legislative history showed that Con-
gress had assumed validity of that precedent. 13 8 Likewise, Flood
inferred that Congress supported its prior decision in Toolson, not-
ing that Congress had rejected efforts to subject the reserve system
to antitrust scrutiny because of specific congressional concerns that
the reserve system be preserved. However, the legislative record re-
lied upon in Flood related to an issue that is no longer relevant to
likely antitrust challenges to Major League Baseball's prac-
tices-decisions about expansion and relocation, the sale television
broadcasting rights, and efforts by the owners to impose a salary
cap on players. Unlike Patterson, there has been no explicit con-
gressional rejection of proposals to overrule or modify Flood to
prohibit these practices,13 and no legislation that assumed Flood's
continuing validity.
The fear that Major League Baseball would abuse its power
concerning in making expansion and relocation decisions was one
of the reasons why Congress chose not to codify baseball's anti-
trust exemption in 1952.1"0 While Flood painted a picture of legis-
lative consensus on the desirability of maintaining the reserve sys-
by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, which overruled a host of
Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113
S.Ct. 2742, 2765-66 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1458 (Souter, J., dissenting) (lower court decisions should not be
overruled because Congress had comprehensively revised the relevant statute in 1975 with-
out disturbing these decisions).
138. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 202-03.
139. For an explanation of why the recent unsuccessful efforts to legislatively overrule
Flood do not indicate congressional endorsement for the continued legality of Major League
Baseball practices, see notes 75-83 supra and accompanying text.
140. One of the principal pieces of evidence of Flood relied on in inferring congres-
sional support for the reserve clause was a 1952 House Committee Report, which concluded
that "the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence established baseball's need for some
sort of reserve clause." 407 U.S. at 272 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 229
(1952)). The same report, however, refused to give "carte blanche immunity" to baseball,
primarily because of the subcommittee's concerns about expansion and relocation issues:
the restrictions on transfer of baseball franchises, together with the enforcement
of those restrictions, have prevented the composition of the major leagues from
reflecting the tremendous population shifts which have occurred in the United
States since 1903. Immunity for such restrictions would certainly tend to perpet-
uate the status quo.
H.R. Rep. No. 2002, Id. at 230.
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tern, even if other concerns about antitrust and sports leagues
precluded agreement on actual legislation, there has been no post-
Flood consensus on Major League Baseball's expansion and reloca-
tion policies. Legislators who have recently advocated continued or
increased antitrust protection for sports leagues in order to pre-
vent franchise shifts have been unable to pass legislation precisely
because of opposition from others who, like their 1952 predeces-
sors, refused to give owners unfettered power over franchise expan-
sion and relocation."' As to television restraints, Congress has spo-
ken directly to this issue, providing a limited statutory exemption
to all sports, including baseball. 42 This strongly indicates that
there is no congressional interest in providing a greater non-statu-
tory immunity. The salary cap is a new form of trade restraint
about which Congress has been entirely silent. Thus, Congress has
not, through "positive inaction" or otherwise, evinced any desire to
protect extend antitrust immunity to Major League Baseball's de-
cisions concerning franchise location, broadcast rights, or salary
caps. 43
In sum, the majority in Patterson consider it "impossible to
assert with any degree of assurance" that congressional failure to
141. Sara Fritz, Two Senators' Price of Legislation: Rozelle's Promise of NFL Expan-
sion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1985, Pt. 3, at 13. See also note 79 supra.
142. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291-95) (Supp. IV 1986)).
143. In his recent confirmation hearings, Justice Stephen Breyer directly addressed
the questions he would ask in considering whether to reconsider a precedent:
How wrong do you think that prior precedent really was as a matter of law?
That is, how badly reasoned was it? You ask yourself how the law has changed
since - all the adjacent laws, all the adjacent rules and regulations. Does it no
longer fit? You ask yourself how have the facts changed. Has the world changed
in very important ways? You ask yourself, insofar - irrespective of how wrong
that prior decision was - as a matter of reasoning, how as it worked out in
practice? Has it proved impossible or very difficult to administer? Has it really
confused matters? And finally you look to the degree of reliance that people
have had in their ordinary lives on that previous precedent.
Confirmation hearings of Justice Stephen Breyer, July 12, 1994.
It is significant, of course, that legislative inaction is not a factor Justice Breyer listed.
Whatever the merits of Flood's reasoning, it is clear that the "adjacent" rules of antitrust
and joint ventures have changed significantly since Flood, see Part I-B, supra; the facts and
the world have changed in "important ways," significantly suggesting that free agency would
not ruin our National Pastime, see Part I-A, supra; "in practice" baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion has caused significant consumer harm, see Part III-C, supra; recent judicial decisions
questioning the scope of the exemption have created confusion; and there has not been sig-
nificant justifiable reliance by Major League Baseball owners on the exemption for their
practices concerning imposition of salary caps, franchise expansion and relocation, and
broadcast rights sales, see Part II-B, supra. Thus, the answers to the questions Justice
Breyer would pose suggests that he would join in voting to reconsider Flood.
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act represents affirmative congressional approval of any given pre-
cedent. 144 Under that approach, the legislative history relied upon
in Flood would not justify adherence to the preemption even if it
suggested continued congressional support for baseball's antitrust
exemption. But even under the approach adopted by Justice
Blackmun in Flood and by Justice Brennan in Patterson, the legis-
lative record since Flood provides no basis whatsoever for inferring
congressional endorsement of trade restraints involving franchise
relocation decisions, broadcast rights sales, or salary caps.
D
Finally, the conclusion that Flood should be reconsidered to-
day is supported by Justice Louis Brandeis' sage insights on the
role of stare decisis as set forth in his oft-cited dissenting opinion
in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.14 5 In that opinion, Brandeis
distinguished between precedents that interpret a text146 and
precedents that apply a text to a given set of facts, and argued that
stare decisis considerations should not be given great weight in the
latter category of cases. The issue in Burnet did not really require
the Court to interpret the Constitution, but simply to apply an ac-
cepted Constitutional principle (that the federal tax laws may not
interfere substantially with state functions) to the particulars of
the case.14 7 Thus, Brandeis argued that an earlier decision holding
that a certain federal tax impermissibly interfered with state func-
tions may well have "been influenced by prevailing views as to eco-
nomic or social policy which have since been abandoned, 14 8 and
therefore should not limit the then-current Justices' ability to
bring their opinions "into agreement with experience and with
facts newly ascertained.' 4
144. 491 U.S. at 176 n.1 (quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
671-72) (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
145. 285 U.S. 393, 446 (1932).
146. Brandeis was discussing constitutional precedents, but the methodology should
be the same for statutory decisions. The difference, as Brandeis noted, is that judicial deci-
sions interpreting statutes can be corrected by legislation, although he catalogued many
Court opinions overruling statutory decisions "in matters deemed important." Id. at 406 &
n.1.
147. Id. at 411.
148. Id. at 412 & n.9 (citing Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv.
L. REV. 641, 651 (1923); Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 HARv. L. REV. (1927); Note, Police Power - Legislation for Health and Personal
Safety, 42 HARV. L. REV. 866, 867, 872 (1929); Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in the En-
glish Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 101, 102 (1928); III CHARLES WARREN, THE SU-
PREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 470, 471.
149. Id. at 412.
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Applying Brandeis' framework, the Court could adhere to
Flood's holding that baseball's "unique characteristics and needs"
are exempt from the antitrust laws, but should permit "experi-
ence" and "facts newly ascertained" to inform its view as to what,
in 1995, falls into that category. This author suggests that little
remains. Experience with litigation with challenging rules that re-
strict players' mobility in other professional sports leagues suggests
that antitrust scrutiny can promote competition without endanger-
ing a sport, and there is no evidence that baseball's characteristics
or needs differ significantly in this regard from football, basketball,
or hockey. The same is true for restraints on the sale of television
rights and decisions concerning franchise expansion and relocation.
Giving a fresh look, advocated by Brandeis, to baseball's "unique
characteristics and needs" would result in antitrust scrutiny for
most, if not all, of Major League Baseball's practices. 150
As Justice Blackmun takes his retirement, with the accompa-
nying retrospectives on his judicial career, and as baseball muddles
through yet another labor dispute, it seems appropriate to reflect
on what Flood v. Kuhn meant in 1972 and means today. Flood has
been severely criticized, both for the result that baseball owners
enjoy a unique exemption from antitrust liability, and for its alleg-
edly formalist reasoning, based on a strict adherence to precedent
and a politically naive understanding of the significance of Con-
gress' failure to act to modify or overturn prior Court decisions
concerning baseball and antitrust. This sort of criticism is not of
the sort normally directed at Justice Blackmun. Rethinking the
structure and reasoning of Flood reveals a decision grounded in
Justice Blackmun's view that more harm than good would come
from subjecting baseball to antitrust, and his perception that Con-
gress had specifically indicated their support for the precise prac-
tice challenged by the plaintiff. This reasoning-based on the facts
and people involved, and recognizing the evolutionary nature of ju-
150. An alternative view of the Court's treatment of the antitrust exemption is that
Brandeis' approach is wrong and that courts should not interpret statutes based on their
experience and perception of social welfare. Unless a court is being disingenuous, however,
the only way for it to determine whether to give stare decisis effect to a precedent would
seem to be: (1) to adopt a strict rule that statutory precedents are never overruled; (2) to
give the precedent only the weight that its persuasiveness merits; or (3) to exercise judicial
discretion. The overwhelming weight of both judicial precedent and sound arguments cau-
tion against implementing a strict rule against overruling. For light-hearted but telling criti-
cism of this alternative view, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Amorous De-
fendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2450
(1990).
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dicial decisonmaking-seems more typical of Justice Blackmun's
jurisprudence. When viewed in this light, Flood was more defensi-
ble in 1972. However, once Flood is no longer viewed in formal or
abstract terms, it becomes clear that there are no congressional sig-
nals pointing in the other direction, and that more good than harm
would come from overruling the decision and requiring baseball
owners to operate under the same laws as everyone else.""
151. 407 U.S. at 283.
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